Yet by the time Russia invaded Ukraine, its opposition had wised up. Russian action in Georgia in 2008 coordinated cyber and conventional military attacks for the first time, supplemented by a broader disinformation campaign, confusing Georgian command and control. ![]() In 2007, following the removal of a Russian war memorial from central Tallinn, the Estonian government, commercial sites and individuals suffered denial-of-service attacks. Of course, the United States and Israel were not the only countries to use cyber to achieve particular ends. But as far as Iranian nuclear efforts were concerned, it was not of itself a game changer and arguably made the cyber landscape more dangerous. If buying time – and introducing short-term confusion – was the goal, then yes, those were achieved. Third, it affirmed the then nascent idea in the US military that cyberwar was a thing: it was clearly regarded by the US administration as a potent tool, with US defense secretary Panetta warning in 2012 of a ‘cyber Pearl Harbour’.Īt an operational level Stuxnet worked – the centrifuges tore themselves apart and had to be replaced – but the longer-term effect on the Iranian program has been less dramatic. Second, it demonstrated the potential physical world effects of cyber malware. First, the code and its exploits are now ‘in the wild’, and so available to others, including those with malign intent. It reflected a deep understanding of the organisational environment: it attacked a specific system and had to be delivered in a specific way. It used several previously unknown software vulnerabilities. Stuxnet was a highly sophisticated piece of code.
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